On September 11, the European Union approved the rollover of the asset freezes and visa bans that the bloc has imposed since February 2022, mainly on Russians, for undermining the territorial integrity of Ukraine. But with the six-month prolongation, there were also two deletions to the blacklist of over 2,300 people and companies: Nikita Mazepin, a former Formula One driver and son of the Russian oligarch Dmitry Mazepin; and Violetta Prigozhina, mother of the late Russian oligarch and Wagner mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Deep Background: These deletions follow a pattern in which a few people are delisted every six months ahead of the formal rollover dates in mid-March and mid-September. This time around, the discussions on the removals were concluded on a lower political level already in July in what some diplomats in Brussels refer to as the biannual “sanctions dance.”
Normally, the discussions are initiated at the behest of Hungary, which has been publicly critical of the bloc’s sanctions policy. Typically, Budapest presents a number of sanctioned people to the other member states in political working groups that it wants taken off the lists in order to give its go-ahead. (Rollovers require unanimity from all 27 EU member states.) These have tended to be heavy-hitter oligarchs with extensive Russian business interests and Kremlin ties such as Alisher Usmanov, Pyotr Aven, Viktor Rashnikov, Mikhail Fridman, Dmitry Mazepin, Grigory Berezkin, and Vyacheslav Moshe Kantor.
Previous rounds have shown that most other member states militantly oppose taking such people off the lists. They have argued it would undermine the whole idea of EU sanctions if people close to President Vladimir Putin were removed and have countered by suggesting that the sanctions should only be prolonged once a year instead of twice. Compromise has always been reached, but the result is a weakened sanctions instrument. Plus, Budapest usually manages to leverage its veto, extracting political favors from Brussels in other policy areas.
After this diplomatic tug-of-war, lawyers from the Council of the EU, one of the bloc’s main decision-making bodies, usually step in to resolve the issue by proposing a list of so-called “weak cases” with less legal justification to be sanctioned.
As the EU claims to be an entity guided by the rule of law, its lawyers must be able to present evidence that can be found in the public domain. And like with every other EU policy, those on the sanctions list can — and do — take the EU to court. Some of those sanctioned have already won cases against Brussels, and they include both Prigozhina and Nikita Mazepin.
Drilling Down
This is, of course, a slight blow for the Russia sanctions regime, but the EU has been here before. In March, three other names were removed — Arkady Volozh, co-founder of the Russian Internet giant Yandex; Russian businessman Sergei Mndoiants; and Jozef Hambalek, a Slovak national and head of the Russian nationalist Night Wolves motorcycle club in Europe.
In my conversations with them, EU diplomats have tried to play down the latest deletions, saying it could be much worse. Prigozhina and Mazepin weren’t that big of players anyway, they say, and the important thing is that the high-rolling oligarchs — such as Mazepin’s father — are still blacklisted
There is already talk about who will be delisted at the next opportunity in March 2025. During the EU ambassadors meeting in Brussels on September 11, the Hungarian and Slovak diplomats pledged that, for the next rollover, they will aim to remove Gulbakhor Ismailova, the sister of Usmanov who has been linked to various key Russian assets.
The statement, circulated among diplomats and seen by RFE/RL, noted that “in our view, the grounds on which the listing of Ms. Ismailova have been based, no longer hold. Ms. Ismailova should be removed from the sanctions list.” Based on this, Slovakia and Hungary will maintain this position during the next review.
Will there be any more? It seems like family members of oligarchs are increasingly seen by EU lawyers as “weak cases,” as it is legally difficult to prove that spouses and children are directly connected to the Russian war machine.
Two possible candidates for the removal would be Galina Pumpyanskaya and Aleksandr Pumpyansky, the wife and son of Russian oligarch Dmitry Pumpyansky. An EU court annulled the sanctions against Aleksandr Pumpyansky in 2023, so he is certainly seen as being a “weak case.”
Two others on the blacklist, Aven and Fridman, have both won cases in EU court against their sanctions. The same as with Pumpyansky junior, they remain blacklisted because Brussels has argued that the cases they won in EU courts concern old listing criteria and refer to a previous sanctions period.
By RFE/RL
